RECONSTITUTING THE FUTURE: AN EQUALITY
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“unto the Seventh Generation . . . ”
Iroquois Law of Peace1
A new constitutional amendment offers a new beginning. The equality
paradigm proposed here recognizes the failures of what is, turns away from
language and interpretive canons rooted in an unjust past, and imagines a
fully functioning democracy as the inheritance of future generations. This
proposal reenvisions constitutional equality from the ground up: it centers
on rectifying the founding acts and omissions of race and sex, separately and
together, and incorporates similar but distinct inequalities.2 It is informed by
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1. This phrase is considered common to multiple traditions. Though it does not appear exactly in
the Iroquois Great Law of Peace, the notion of fealty to future generations is written there in symbols on
wampum. See Terri Hansen, How the Iroquois Great Law of Peace Shaped U.S. Democracy, PBS (Dec.
17,
2018,
10:48
AM),
https://www.pbs.org/native-america/blogs
/native-voices/how-the-iroquois-great-law-of-peace-shaped-us-democracy
[https://perma
.cc/7JX6-QLTJ]; see also Gerald Murphy, Modern History Sourcebook: The Constitution of the Iroquois
Confederacy,
FORDHAM
U.
(Apr.
12,
2019),
https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod
/iroquois.asp [https://perma.cc/BQ8E-79JR]. The most widely cited iteration of the Seventh Generation
concept was expressed by the former head of the Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy, Leon Shenandoah (d. 1996): “Look behind you. See your sons and your daughters. They are your future. Look farther
and see your sons’ and your daughters’ children and their children’s children even unto the Seventh Generation. That’s the way we were taught. Think about it: you yourself are a Seventh Generation.” Gina
Boltz, Words from the Circle: Native American Quotes, NATIVE VILLAGE (2016), https://www.nativevillage.org/Libraries/Quote/Native%20American%20Quotes%2034.htm [https://perma.cc/3RC2-XH9Z].
Fealty to subsequent generations is deeply rooted in Iroquois civilization, as evidenced by its inclusion in
the constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy. See CONST. IROQUOIS NATIONS art. 28 (“Look and listen
for the welfare of the whole people and have always in view not only the present but also the coming
generations, even those whose faces are yet beneath the surface of the ground—the unborn of the future
Nation.”); id. art. 57.
2. This proposal reflects insights, aspirations, and critiques of many thinkers and actors—activists,
lawyers, theorists, humans with a stake in taming illegitimate power. The Equality Amendment presented
here is the joint product of two intensive meetings coconvened by the ERA Coalition and the African
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prior efforts to integrate equality into the constitutional landscape that have
been decimated by political reversals and doctrinal backlash. It aggregates
the insights, aspirations, and critiques of many thinkers and actors who have
seized this moment to breathe new life into the nation’s reckoning with inequality. It neither looks back to celebrate amendments whose transformative
possibilities have been defeated nor participates in contemporary handwringing over equality’s jurisprudential limitations. It seeks to make equality
real and to matter now. We argue that a new equality paradigm is necessary
and present one form it could take.
I.

WHY REAL EQUALITY MATTERS NOW

Equality is the foundational problem of the American Republic. White
supremacy and male dominance, separately and together, were hardwired
into a proslavery and tacitly gender-exclusive Constitution from the beginning. All enslaved people, Native people, and women were consciously and

American Policy Forum at Columbia Law School, cochaired by the authors on November 19, 2016 and
December 20, 2016, in which Charles Lawrence, Mari Matsuda, Gloria Steinem, Carol Jenkins, Jessica
Neuwirth, Terry O’Neill, and Carol Robles Roman participated. Their acumen, insights, and erudition
contributed greatly to the final draft, which we have since modified slightly. While the discussions were
collective, the authors are solely responsible for any errors in the content of the proposal and the arguments herein.
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purposely excluded.3 White men of property4 intentionally designed the constituting document to ensure the continued institutional existence of the enslavement of Africans and people of African descent,5 the exclusion of

3. As Kathleen Sullivan observed,
[T]he U.S. Constitution, in its original text, never referred to women at all. The only known
use of the pronoun ‘she’ in the framing deliberations concerned a later-rejected clause that
would have referred to the rendition of fugitive slaves. . . . The Constitution provided no explicit protection . . . against laws that disenfranchised women, excluded them from juries,
barred married women from owning property or suing in their own capacity, and the like.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 735, 735–36 (2002). The
tension between women seeking constitutional representation and men resisting it can be seen in letters
between Abigail and John Adams in 1776. Abigail Adams pled:
I long to hear that you have declared an independency—and by the way in the new Code of
Laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to make I desire you would Remember the
Ladies, and be more generous and favourable to them than your ancestors. Do not put such
unlimited power into the hands of the Husbands. Remember all Men would be tyrants if they
could. If particular care and attention is not paid to the Ladies we are determined to foment a
Rebelion, and will not hold ourselves bound by any Laws in which we have no voice, or
Representation.
Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776), in 1 ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE
(1761-1776) 369, 370 (L. H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1961) (original spelling retained). John Adams’s reply,
combined jocularity and denial with a threatening bottom-line common to the language of misogyny then
and now:
Depend upon it, We know better than to repeal our Masculine systems. Altho they are in full
Force, you know they are little more than Theory. We dare not exert our Power in its full
Latitude. We are obliged to go fair, and softly, and in Practice you know We are the subjects.
We have only the Name of Masters, and rather than give up this, which would compleatly
subject Us to the Despotism of the Peticoat, I hope General Washington, and all our brave
Heroes would fight.
Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Apr. 14, 1776), in 1 ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE
(1761-1776), supra, at 381, 382 (original spelling retained).
4. Among the property-owning white men generally recognized as “Founding Fathers,” the following owned slaves: Charles Carroll; Samuel Chase; Benjamin Franklin, who eventually manumitted
his slaves and became an abolitionist; Button Gwinnett; John Hancock; Patrick Henry; John Jay; Thomas
Jefferson; Richard Henry Lee; James Madison; Charles Cotesworth Pinckney; Benjamin Rush; Edward
Rutledge; and George Washington. See Anthony Iaccarino, The Founding Fathers and Slavery,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica
.com/topic/The-Founding-Fathers-and-Slavery-1269536 [https://perma.cc/4Q9C-HDA9].
5. “[O]f the 11 clauses in the Constitution that deal with or have policy implications for slavery,
10 protect slave property and the powers of masters. Only one, the international slave-trade clause, points
to a possible future power by which, after 20 years, slavery might be curtailed . . . .” David Waldstreicher,
How
the
Constitution
Was
Indeed
Pro-Slavery,
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
19,
2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/how-the
-constitution-was-indeed-pro-slavery/406288 [https://perma.cc/SNX5-NHK9]; see also DON E.
FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC 15–47 (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001) (describing the
role of ‘slavery in the founding of the United States and how the Constitution protects slavery); DAVID
WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION 107–52 (2009) (describing how the Constitution protects
slavery); Juan F. Perea, Race and Constitutional Law Casebooks: Recognizing the Proslavery Constitution, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1123–25 (2012) (same).
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women from full citizenship, and the silencing of all of their voices in authoritative forums.6 Enslaved Africans were counted as three-fifths of a person to give political weight to slave-owning states;7 the Electoral College
was configured to assure the power of slave states in electing the federal
executive officer;8 no woman or enslaved person was permitted to vote.
Equality was not mentioned in either the debates in Philadelphia or the resulting document. This raced and gendered institutionalization of power was,
and has been, presented as the epitome of freedom and independence.
Since the Founding, constitutional amendments and legislation—impelled by armed struggle and urgent organizing—have guaranteed equality
based on race and sex to some degree. This progress has emerged from cataclysmic upheavals and decades-long agitation to address the raw expression
of subordination built into the Constitution. Limited equality rights have, at
times, been extended to women and people of color by judicial interpretation
and legislation.9 Yet, retraction and resistance to these efforts hollowed out
6. It is said that the Iroquois Confederacy’s structures influenced Franklin and the Framers, but the
Iroquois’s recognition of women’s equality and their requirement that every decision be considered for
its impact on the Seventh Generation were omitted. See H.R. Con. Res. 331, 100th Cong. (1988) (enacted)
(acknowledging the contribution of the Iroquois Confederacy to the U.S. Constitution, noting Franklin’s
admiration for the Iroquois Confederacy and its influence on the American political system). This position
is considered inaccurate by scholars who research written records. See Erik M. Jensen, The Harvard Law
Review and the Iroquois Influence Thesis, 6 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 225, 225 (2017) (dismissing “the
Iroquois influence thesis” as “nonsense”); Elisabeth Tooker, The United States Constitution and the Iroquois League, 35 ETHNOHISTORY 305, 305 (1988) (“A number of writers have suggested that the League
of the Iroquois provided the model for the United States Constitution and the ideas embodied in it. A
review of the evidence in the historical and ethnographic documents, however, offers virtually no support
for this contention.”); Jack Rakove, Did the Founding Fathers Really Get Many of Their Ideas of Liberty
from the Iroquois?, HIST. NEWS NETWORK (July 21, 2005), https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/12974
[https://perma.cc/H3AH-Q5VE].
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
8. At the Constitutional Convention, James Madison suggested that a direct presidential election
“would have been a dealbreaker [sic] for the South” because slaves could not vote and the “slaveholding
South would basically lose every time.” Akhil Reed Amar, Opinion, Actually, the Electoral College Was
a
Pro-Slavery
Ploy,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
6,
2019),
https://www.nytimes
.com/2019/04/06/opinion/electoral-college-slavery.html [https://perma.cc/V5ZL-N59D]. Despite alternative interpretations, there is no disputing that the South “had extra seats in the Electoral College because
of its slaves.” Id. And while the implications of the system were abundantly clear by the time the Constitution was amended to modify the Electoral College, “Jefferson’s Southern allies steamrollered over
Northern congressmen who explicitly proposed eliminating the system’s pro-slavery bias.” Id.; see also
Alan Singer, Slavery and the Electoral College: One Last Response to Sean Wilentz, HIST. NEWS
NETWORK (Apr. 21, 2019), https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/171783 [https://perma.cc/HS75QHR3] (agreeing that the Electoral College defended the institution of slavery).
9. Following the Civil War, constitutional amendments aimed to promote racial equality, see U.S.
CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, while Congress enacted laws intended to deinstitutionalize Jim Crow,
see Civil Rights Act of 1875, Pub. L. No. 43-114, 18 Stat. 335; Third Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 4222, 17 Stat. 13 (1871); Second Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 41-99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871); First Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 41-114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870); Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866, Pub. L. No. 39-200,
14 Stat. 173; Civil Rights Act of 1866, Pub. L. No. 39-31, 14 Stat. 27; and Freedmen’s Bureau Act of
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the ground-shifting post-Civil War Amendments, limited the interpretation
of the Nineteenth Amendment, blocked ratification of the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA), and dismantled the mid-twentieth century’s modest
equality infrastructure. Constitutional equality was effectively stripped of its
regenerative potential. Their roots in the constitutional landscape now weakened, both gender and race equality have been cast into treacherous seas—
with gender hanging onto race like a castaway clinging to a slender piece of
doctrinal driftwood.
Each moment of mobilization and democratic participation toward real
equality has been met by a reflexive reassertion of the rights, values, and
entitlements of a modestly reformed status quo. Courts in particular have
dramatically and continuously undermined efforts to rectify race and gender
subordination in society by rolling back what legal equality guarantees could
have achieved. As a result, prior efforts have not produced real equality in
social life, nor can they until the racial and gendered baselines that ground
the constitutional order are denaturalized and uprooted.
As a central instance, judicial interpretation has continuously hobbled
the Fourteenth Amendment’s promising guarantee of equal protection of the
laws.10 Indeed, the Amendment’s most far-reaching implications, which
could have dismantled the legal infrastructure that constituted and insulated
white supremacy, were snuffed out in their infancy. Less than twenty years
after the formal end of slavery, the Supreme Court characterized congressional efforts to remedy widespread discrimination against Black people as
special treatment.11 A century later, courts brutally truncated the Amendment’s mid-twentieth century renaissance12 by interpreting inequality so narrowly that its reproduction remains largely undisturbed by any meaningful

1865, Pub. L. No. 38-90, 13 Stat. 507. However, courts quickly restricted these initiatives’ potential for
greatest impact. See, e.g., Cumming v. Richmond Cty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (permitting
racial segregation in schools); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (permitting racial segregation in
public facilities as consistent with the meaning of constitutional equality); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883) (holding Congress was not empowered to end private racial discrimination); United States
v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (holding that provisions of the Bill of Rights do not apply to state
governments); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (narrowly construing the Fifteenth Amendment); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (holding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only protected rights of national, not state, citizenship).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause has been interpreted
to apply constitutional equality standards to the federal government, just as the Fourteenth Amendment
does to the states. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
11. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25 (repudiating the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in part for
treating African Americans as the “special favorite” of the law).
12. Courts’ interpreting prior guarantees to end legalized segregation are examples. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (upholding policies to end de facto school segregation); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (upholding Congress’s power to bar private
racial discrimination in property sales under the Thirteenth Amendment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
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legal imperatives.13
Fatally, in Washington v. Davis, the Court decreed that nonexplicit discrimination with disparate effects on racial groups must be proven intentional to be unconstitutional.14 In the Court’s view, an overwhelmingly disparate injury inflicted on a disadvantaged racial group was not enough to
trigger equal protection concern even in the face of utterly predictable and
proven outcomes.15 Only actions taken with a conscious desire to actively
harm a vulnerable group would be held illegal.16 Discriminatory intent, so
defined, is subjective. Evidence of it is thus largely within the control of accused discriminators, making it easy to exercise, easy to deny, and almost
impossible to prove. Consequently, prevailing constitutional doctrine effectively insulates countless decisions that actively harm structurally subordinated populations.
The Court doubled down on the intent requirement in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, applying it to sex.17 It held that a
preference for veterans in employment that predictably and knowingly advantaged men over women was constitutionally permissible absent proof that
the scheme was deployed specifically to hurt women. Feeney spelled out
with devastating clarity that decision-makers could comfortably rest disparity-producing preferences on the built-in inequalities created by myriad institutions—so long as they could plausibly deny a specific intent to harm
women.18 By depriving women of the right to challenge disadvantages built

U.S. 483 (1954) (holding de jure racial segregation in schools unconstitutional); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950) (requiring state law school admit Black students under the Fourteenth Amendment);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding racially restrictive housing covenants judicially unenforceable under the Fourteenth Amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding racial
limitations on political party membership unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment); Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding that states must provide legal education facilities for
Blacks that were substantially equal to those for whites). But these efforts have been increasingly stymied.
13. See, e.g., Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291 (2014) (holding that
states may constitutionally ban affirmative action by referendum); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (prohibiting use of race classifications in school-assignment
plans); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (invalidating a public university’s specific use of race in
admissions); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (prohibiting racial quotas in
state medical school admissions); Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228
(W.D.N.C. 1999) (holding a public magnet school’s consideration of race constitutionally impermissible).
14. 426 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 240 (holding that the “invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose”).
17. 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (holding that a law’s disparate impact on women must be intentional
in order to be deemed sex based and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
18. Id.
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on preferences for men—even those made possible by the near-complete exclusion of women by law or policy—the Court largely reduced the Equal
Protection Clause to a minimalist intervention against some explicitly discriminatory articulations termed “facial.”19
Submerged was the deeper obstacle to meaningful gender equality. Sex
discrimination is more often accomplished by omission of socially gendered
experiences such as pregnancy or sexual assault than explicitly expressed in
law. The narrowing of constitutional sex equality jurisprudence to mainly
facial discrimination further gutted the Equal Protection Clause of its substantive potential. In much the same way that the Court resisted conceptions
of equality that disrupted the existing distribution of white rights and entitlements, Feeney—considered a non-facial case—ensured that gendered baselines favoring men, including legal ones, would frame practices that mapped
onto them as benign or not gendered at all. This made the inequality these
practices imposed difficult or impossible to expose, contest, and change by
law.
In the Court’s sense of vindictively motivated acts consciously targeted
“because of” group membership, most discrimination is not intentional.20 But
discrimination is no less damaging when built into social norms and structures. Decision-makers, driven by unconscious or implicit bias in favor of
the superiority of whites and/or men,21 may fail to perceive or appreciate the
heavy burden their actions force on subordinated groups. No conscious intent
is required for such bias to animate decision-making; yet existing constitutional doctrine makes its recognition as discrimination extremely difficult,
facilitating the reproduction of inequality.
The intent requirement, paired with the formalistic policing of classifications under heightened review, together stabilize rather than dismantle the
raced and gendered social order. Racial classifications, under prevailing tiers-of-scrutiny analysis, are subject to strict scrutiny, grounded in the observation that historically they have been vehicles of racial subordination.22 Yet
19. There is no doctrinal test for what is facial and what is not.
20. Id. at 270.
21. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (noting that most Americans are “unaware” of their
racism and fail to acknowledge how cultural experiences influence beliefs about race); see also Charles
R. Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of “The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection,” 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 939–40 (2008) (revisiting his 1987 article and exploring how white supremacy is maintained). In the years since Charles Lawrence’s initial publication,
much research has supported his analysis. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 20 (1995); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 971–73 (2006); Justine
E. Tinkler, Controversies in Implicit Bias Research, 6 SOC. COMPASS 987, 987–88 (2012).
22. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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the history that animates the Court’s apoplectic denunciations of racial classifications has been abstracted from its material reality and gentrified with
new occupants. Measured against a historical standard, the landmark race
cases of the post-Warren Court era have arguably been white-rights cases23—
largely successful campaigns to arrest legislative and administrative efforts
to remedy the contemporary consequences of the very history that justifies
heightened scrutiny.24 The Equal Protection Clause must mean the same
thing for everybody, the Court majestically intones. But packaged in its misleading rhetoric equating colorblindness and gender neutrality—so-called
same treatment—with constitutional equality are precisely the discordant
protections that the Court repudiates. The Court shields the rights and entitlements of those whom the Constitution has historically privileged and disarms the aspirations of those it has historically excluded.
The difficult doctrinal barriers the Court imposed on racially subordinated groups are virtually absent in the jurisprudence developed in response
to white grievances against remedial measures. Legal standing, causation,
presumptions, and burdens of proof reveal not only a lightened burden for
white plaintiffs; they also expose the stubborn baselines against which corrective remedies are repackaged as illegitimate preferences that discriminate
against white people. The Court’s supposed solicitude for an equality that
means the same thing to everyone—“neutrality”—obscures its more reliable
role in defending white supremacy.
The gravitational pull of the foundational baselines obscures the discriminatory dimensions of an Equal Protection Clause that protects and insulates gendered as well as racial power, while co-opting the tools that might
disrupt the reproduction of such inequality. The elision of gender bias is so
deeply entrenched that it is not seen as gender-based at all. Sexual assault,
reproductive control, and the family, for instance, are all crucial sites of the
creation and exercise of male power, yet laws about them are overwhelmingly not assessed by equality standards at all. Even where gender-based
equality nominally exists in law, it is constrained by a fixation with classifications and their ranking into tiers of scrutiny.25 This approach effectively
means that the more perfectly a distinction by law fits a distinction in society,
the more “rational”—hence, less discriminatory—it is seen to be.
The result is that the more effective a system of inequality is socially,
the more “rational” it will be found constitutionally, rendering constitutional

23. See Luke C. Harris, Lessons Still Unlearned: The Continuing Sounds of Silence, 10 DU BOIS
REV. 513 (2013).
24. See id.
25. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 438 (1985); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 211 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
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law virtually useless in disrupting the conditions that most need changing to
end gender inequality.26 Recognizing “sex” as a suspect classification would
not solve this problem but rather would accentuate its effect, given that the
Court looks to whether “sex” justifies a sex classification, and what it finds
to be “sex” is frequently the reality of social sex (that is, gender) inequality.
Requiring the sexes to be “similarly situated” before a discrimination claim
can be brought also serves to evade the reality that social discrimination often prevents women from being situated similarly to men in the first place.
The fundamental strategy of sex equality litigation has been to get rights for
men in order to get them for women. Constitutional equal protection law has
accordingly worked better for men, whose claims of sex discrimination have
provided its foundation,27 than for women of any color.
This basic approach—a separate and overly vigilant policing of remedial racial classifications, a status-quo-oriented solicitude toward gender,
and a failure to recognize sex inequality other than in the facial sense—reinforces rather than remedies cascading social harms across multiple overlapping constituencies. It has not only left victims of combined discrimination
in a quandary as to the standard that applies to them;28 it has drained the
blood, sweat, and tears of those who sought to replace the flawed vision of
the Founders with a constitutional order that embodies the rhetorical claims
made in its defense.
As a result, white and male supremacy continues and is socially resurgent, reinforcing brutal, sometimes lethal, disadvantages. The Founders’
handprints are visible across social hierarchies today despite corrective
amendments and diligent litigation. The contemporary consequences of the
founding formula have not been erased by gradualist improvements and
symbolic reforms—and as things stand will not be. Material inequalities between the enslaved and those who benefitted from their enslavement, un-

26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding that a statute that required husbands but not
wives to pay alimony violated the Equal Protection Clause); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979)
(striking down as unconstitutional a New York statute that allowed unwed mothers but not unwed fathers
a veto over the adoption of that couple’s children); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that a
statute that denied the sale of alcohol to individuals of the same age based on their gender violated the
Equal Protection Clause); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (striking down a provision of
the Social Security Act that permitted widows but not widowers to collect special benefits while caring
for children); see also David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women’s Rights in a Man’s
World, 2 LAW & INEQ. 33, 33–35 (1984) (examining effects of several leading sex discrimination cases
brought by male plaintiffs).
28. See Devon W. Carbado & Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, An Intersectional Critique of Tiers of Scrutiny: Beyond “Either/Or” Approaches to Equal Protection, 129 YALE L.J.F. 108 (2019) (deploying an
intersectional analysis to reveal how the tiers-of-scrutiny analysis obscures the incoherence of the standard particularly with respect to Black women).
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compensated and unremedied, live on in yawning wealth and well-being disparities, conditions that the Court considers uncorrectable societal inequality. Like their enslaved ancestors, African Americans experience greater exposure to racialized surveillance and state-sanctioned violence,29 suffer
compromised access to education,30 housing31 and health care,32 and face
continuing obstacles to their full political participation.33

29. Young Black men are more likely to be incarcerated, and are less represented in college-student
populations, than their white peers. E.g., Criminal Justice Facts, SENT’G PROJECT, https://www.sentencingproject.org/criminal-justice-facts [https://perma.cc/89DH-TT3Z] (noting that one in three Black
young men born in the United States in 2001 will become incarcerated, as compared to one in seventeen
white young men); The Condition of Education 2019: College Enrollment Rates, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STAT.
2
(2019),
https://nces.ed.gov
/programs/coe/pdf/coe_cpb.pdf [https://perma.cc/PEP3-DFPG]. Black people are terrifyingly vulnerable
to unpunished police brutality. See, e.g., Anthony L. Bui et al., Years of Life Lost Due to Encounters with
Law Enforcement in the USA, 2015-2016, 72 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 715, 716 (2018)
(highlighting that police violence disproportionately impacts young people of color).
Although vulnerability to violence is frequently understood as male-exclusive, Black women also face
disproportionate risks of both lethal state violence and private violence. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw
& Andrea J. Ritchie, Say Her Name: Resisting Police Brutality Against Black Women,” AFR. AM. POL’Y
F.
4–7
(2015)
http://static1.squarespace.com/static
/53f20d90e4b0b80451158d8c/t/55a810d7e4b058f342f55873/1437077719984/AAPF_SM_Brief_full_si
ngles.compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK8V-WWS5].
30. African Americans attend schools that are more racially segregated now than they were when
segregation was first prohibited. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, Report: Public Schools More Segregated Now
Than 40 Years Ago, WASH. POST. (Aug. 29, 2013, 3:49 PM EST), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2013/08/29/report-public-schools
-more-segregated-now-than-40-years-ago [https://perma.cc/M7XE-K2JA]. See generally Erica Frankenberg & Chungmei Lee, Race in American Public Schools: Rapidly Resegregating School Districts, HARV.
U.: C.R. PROJECT (Aug. 2002), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integrationand-diversity/race-in-american-public-schools-rapidly
-resegregating-school-districts/frankenberg-rapidly-resegregating-2002.pdf
[https://perma
.cc/LQ56-F48M] (describing increasing school segregation since the 1980s).
31. See, e.g., Joseph P. Williams, Segregation’s Legacy, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 20, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2018-04-20/us-is-still-segregated
-even-after-fair-housing-act [https://perma.cc/MQZ8-Z8WV] (noting that fifty years after the Fair Housing Act, designed to eliminate housing discrimination, was signed into to law, America remains nearly as
segregated as when the law was passed). See generally Bruce Mitchell & Juan Franco, HOLC “Redlining” Maps: The Persistent Structure of Segregation and Economic Inequality, NAT’L COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT
COALITION
(Mar.
20,
2018),
https://ncrc.org
/holc [https://perma.cc/9ESA-CVR7] (describing growing housing segregation).
32. Jennifer Jones, Comment, Bakke at 40: Remedying Black Health Disparities Through Affirmative Action in Medical School Admissions, 66 UCLA L. REV. 522, 532–33 (2019) (noting disparities in
Black health outcomes, such as shortened life expectancies compared to whites, higher infant mortality
rates, and higher death rates from cancer and AIDS).
33. See, e.g., Vann R. Newkirk II, Voter Suppression is Warping Democracy, ATLANTIC (July 17,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/poll-prri-voter-suppression
/565355 [https://perma.cc/C2T4-9HD2] (noting deep structural barriers to the ballot for minority voters).
White women in slave-owning families and institutions not only benefitted from those systems, but were
at times active agents within it, buying and selling enslaved people, exploiting that relation for relative
empowerment. See STEPHANIE E. JONES-ROGERS, THEY WERE HER PROPERTY: WHITE WOMEN AS
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The material and spiritual dimensions of lives shaped by the theft of
land and national integrity from Native Americans and the Mexican State are
also framed in sociopolitical discourse as natural and inevitable, rather than
as the contemporary manifestations of a ruthlessly constitutionalized colonial and imperial regime. Native peoples and their cultures continue to be
subjected to assimilationist pressures and land, resource and child expropriation—contemporary forms of genocidal practices historically inflicted by
the U.S. government.34 Unfettered by meaningful constitutional constraints,
Native peoples have been deprived of self-determination, jurisdiction to adjudicate aggression (including sexual) against them, and many treaty rights.35
Native women are disproportionately trafficked for sex, prostituted, and disappeared.36 Beyond anti-Black and settler colonialism are institutionalized
patterns of xenophobic bias against immigrants of color, which deprive
scores of people of basic human rights, including rights to security and family.37
The historical foundations upon which male supremacy rests continue
to ground conceptions of gender equality that normalize gender hierarchy
and frame departures from it as exceptional. Discrimination based on sex and
gender, to the limited extent it has been constitutionally prohibited, has been
recognized only very recently and merely by interpretation—not originally,

SLAVE OWNERS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH (2019).
34. See, e.g., Barbara Perry, From Ethnocide to Ethnoviolence: Layers of Native American Victimization, 5 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 231, 232–33 (2002) (exploring the various forms of institutionalized
exploitation and marginalization of Native Americans); Lisa. M. Poupart, The Familiar Face of Genocide: Internalized Oppression Among American Indians, 18 HYPATIA 86, 87 (2003) (discussing how the
consequences of colonialism have created a government-sanctioned systematic genocide of American
Indians).
35. For examples of deprivations of treaty rights, see New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462
U.S. 324 (1983) (hunting and fishing); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980)
(logging); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (timber); and Johnson v. M’Intosh,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 588 (1823) (“Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot
deny. . . .”). Native peoples have also been deprived of legal jurisdictions in criminal law. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indians, Race, and Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 49,
49 (2017) (explaining that criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country depends on whether the alleged perpetrator or victim qualifies as “Indian”).
36. See, e.g., Steven W. Perry, American Indians and Crime 1991-2002, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 6 (2004);
Sarah Deer, Relocation Revisited: Sex Trafficking of Native Women in the United States, 36 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 621, 624–29 (2010) (explaining the relationship between colonization and sex trafficking of Native women).
37. See Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S. Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform After
“9/11?”, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 333–37 (2003) (explaining how an “anchor” immigration system like that of the U.S. disfavors people from groups previously excluded from admission, and disproportionately impacts immigrants of color).
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textually, or historically—making its protection particularly thin and vulnerable.38 Despite some legal progress for (mostly elite) women, male dominance continues to characterize existing laws and their application.39 Laws
responsive to women’s circumstances and the social order that subordinates
them either do not exist or are unenforced.40 State laws against domestic violence and sexual assault have virtually never been held to equality standards
in their design or effect.41 The federal legislation against violence against
women was found to lack constitutional basis.42 Pregnancy is not constitutionally recognized as sex based,43 limiting defenses of reproductive rights
to those that live under other constitutional rubrics. All women on average
are not paid equally to men—largely because they are segregated into work
that is valued less because women are doing it, or that is seen as appropriate
for women because it is valued less hence paid less.44 This dynamic is accentuated for women of color.45 This pervasive social arrangement has been
38. Discrimination based on sex and gender was first constitutionally recognized by the Supreme
Court in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), which held that sex-differential laws must be rationally
related to valid legislative purpose.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that an elite military college’s
policy of excluding women violates the Equal Protection Clause); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989) (finding that a firm denying accounting partnership to a woman employee because of sex
stereotyping constitutes sex discrimination). But see Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)
(recognizing statutory sexual harassment as sex discrimination, a non-elite advance).
40. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 3 (3d ed. 2016) (noting the “potent combination of social and political mechanisms” that enforce the institutionalized subordination of women).
41. See Andrea B. Carroll, Family Law and Female Empowerment, 24 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 11–
22 (2017) (detailing how state laws attempting to help domestic-violence victims actually impair some
women’s rights). However, state statutes are held to equality standards when they are said to discriminate
facially against men. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), where a state sexual
assault statute said to facially apply only to men who had sex with underage girls was upheld. No position
is taken here on whether men were discriminated against by the statute, although a substantive equality
rationale for the ruling would have been an improvement.
42. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617, 627 (2000) (holding that Congress exceeded its
authority under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause in enacting the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994).
43. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974).
44. MACKINNON, supra note 40, at 253–56. Women also provide most of the unpaid caretaking
work for their own families. Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and
Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 323 (2014).
45. For instance, in 2018, the median income of Black women was only 65.3% of the median income of white men, whereas white women earned 81.5% of what white men earned. Ariane Hegewisch
& Heidi Hartmann, The Gender Wage Gap: 2018 Earnings Differences by Race and Ethnicity, INST. FOR
WOMEN’S
POL’Y
RES.
(Mar.
7,
2019),
https://iwpr.org/wp-content
/uploads/2019/03/C478_Gender-Wage-Gap-in-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG6Y-8HFY]; see also Katherine Richard, The Wealth Gap for Women of Color, CTR. FOR GLOBAL POL’Y SOLUTIONS (Oct. 2014)
http://www.globalpolicysolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10
/Wealth-Gap-for-Women-of-Color.pdf [https://perma.cc/JH74-M7F6] (finding that in 2012, Black
women and Latina women earned 64% and 54% of wages of white men, while white women earned 78%
of wages of white men).
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found not to violate existing equality laws.46 Women, within and across racial groups, are comparatively impoverished and economically insecure.
They are violated with impunity, exploited economically and sexually, and
deprived of social stature and human dignity. The intersectional effects of
race and gender are facilitated within the U.S. sociolegal system, cumulatively stacking the deck against women of color, depriving them of the most
basic means to articulate meaningful claims within existing constitutional
doctrine.
The vitiation of equality on the bases of race and gender extends to related forms of hierarchy. Discrimination based on sexual orientation enforces compulsory heterosexuality, a means of maintaining male supremacy.
Even in the face of the striking legal progress for lesbian women and gay
men in recent years, their rights are restricted to areas in which state or federal statutes have been invalidated by the courts—for example, by prohibiting laws criminalizing sodomy47 and by requiring recognition of same-sex
marriage48—or under statutes guaranteeing sex equality.49 However, in some
jurisdictions, same-sex partners can still be married on Sunday and fired on
Monday for the same reason.50 Discrimination against transgender people,
another kind of gender-based discrimination, is frequently brutal and lethal,

46. See, e.g., County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 179–80 (1981) (allowing a comparable
worth claim so long as women prison guards’ pay rates are proven intentionally discriminatory); Am.
Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps. (AFSCME) v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1406–07 (9th Cir. 1985)
(holding that Title VII permits Washington to set wages according to historically sex discriminatory market practices).
47. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
48. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018). See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112–13
(2d Cir. 2018) (holding that sexual orientation discrimination is a subset of sex discrimination prohibited
under Title VII), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339,
345 (7th Cir. 2017) (same).
50. Whether the Title VII prohibition on sex discrimination applies to sexual orientation or
transgender status is pending before the Supreme Court, to be decided during the 2019 Term. See Altitude
Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (cert. granted); Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 139 S. Ct. 1599
(2019) (same); Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (same). This issue has particular impact on the intersection of sexual orientation, gender identity, and race. A recent study analyzing
over 9,000 sexual-orientation and gender identity discrimination charges found an “overrepresentation of
Black charging parties,” which, combined with allegations of race discrimination, “suggests that the intersection of these stigmatized identities could shape experiences of employment discrimination for this
group.” M.V. Lee Badgett et al., Evidence from the Frontlines on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Discrimination, UNIV. OF MASS. AMHERST: CTR. FOR EMP’T EQUITY (July 2018),
https://www.umass.edu/employmentequity/evidence-frontlines-sexual-orientation-and
-gender-identity-discrimination [https://perma.cc/8VVF-DQAM].
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causing unemployment,51 homelessness,52 and vicious stigmatization without
meaningful systemic relief.53
Inequality is not inevitable. Indeed, it takes considerable force to maintain, given the fact that all peoples are human equals—meaning, at minimum,
that no racial and/or gendered group is actually superior or inferior to another. Human hierarchy based on sex and/or race is not only a political construction created to confer power on some over others. It is predicated on the
lie of natural hierarchy: the fiction that the actual basis, origin, and foundation of the present socially tiered status of sex- and race-based groups is sex
and/or race itself, rather than the power interests of those who dominate on
those grounds—grounds that are themselves constructed by these same politically interested configurations. Failure to order societies to correspond to
the reality of equality has resulted in the intensification of inequality over
time, making it appear to be “just there” to many, reinforcing the ideology
of its natural basis. The law’s participation in obscuring the fact that the existing system is one of imposed social hierarchy rather than natural difference—or, in any event, that such “differences” as exist are equal—has rationalized and legitimated inequality.
As a result, despite the focused and determined efforts of committed
movements, communities, organizations, lawyers, and some scholars, led by
generations of valiant activists, the United States remains a deeply unequal
society. Its laws, against formidable interventions for change, have largely
operated to maintain that inequality. This must end.

51. Sandy E. James et al., The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, NAT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 140–41 (Dec. 2016), https://transequality.org/sites/default/files
/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RTJ-TKLX].
52. Id. at 110.
53. Some circuits have recognized transgender discrimination as sex discrimination under Title VII.
See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th
Cir. 2004); Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204
F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000). The best decision conceptually is the breakthrough case of Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008). Other courts refuse to cover gender identity discrimination under
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination. See, e.g., Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3114, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002). Trans individuals continue to face “extraordinary”
levels of physical and sexual violence, with more than one in four trans people reporting that they have
faced a “bias-driven assault” and even higher rates for trans women and trans people of color. Issues:
Anti-Violence, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, https://transequality.org/isues/anti
-violence [https://perma.cc/BH5H-ZRMW].
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II. NEW EQUALITY AMENDMENT DRAFT
The Equality Amendment
Whereas all women, and men of color, were historically excluded as
equals, intentionally and functionally, from the Constitution of the
United States, subordinating these groups structurally and systemically; and
Whereas prior constitutional amendments have allowed extreme inequalities of race and/or sex and/or like grounds of subordination to
continue without effective legal remedy, and have even been used to
entrench such inequalities; and
Whereas this country aspires to be a democracy of, by, and for all of
its people, and to treat all people of the world in accordance with human rights principles;

Therefore be it enacted that—
Section 1. Women in all their diversity shall have equal rights in the
United States and every place subject to its jurisdiction.

This language provides affirmative equality rights to all women, rather
than prohibiting states from denying women equal rights, whether intentionally or inadvertently, facially or by impact. Because women are not exclusively, or even principally, made or kept unequal to men by the actions of
states, but rather by the social order—its structures, forces, institutions, and
individuals acting in concert—this Section has no state-action requirement.
The state does not so much act to deny equality of rights through law as it
fails to guarantee freedom from these violations, and fails to provide legal
claims against them or precludes those claims altogether. Equality is powerfully denied to women through law abdicating an equality role, for example,
in domestic violence, sexual abuse and exploitation, and unequal pay for
work of comparable worth. Law allows these violations to happen, and to
continue to happen, until they form the substrate of the normal. The negative
state—the state as embodied in a constitution that supposedly guarantees
rights best by intervening in society least—has largely abandoned women to
social inequality imposed on them by men. This Section therefore affirmatively envisions equality as a right, permitting legal claims for discrimination
against nonstate actors and state actors alike who deny equal rights to
women.
Marginal improvements can be made in women’s conditions by addressing sex as an abstraction, as in Section 2 of this Amendment. But abstract equality enshrines dominant groups as the standard, failing to rectify
discrimination for those who do not meet it. Inequality, meanwhile, itself
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denies access to the means of meeting dominant standards and creates the
illusion that those standards are neutral or meritocratic, when they are simply
dominant. Substantive equality, in contrast, begins with recognizing the concrete historical situation of subjected, violated, and denigrated people, called
by name: women in all their diversity.54 This concrete language is particularly useful for avoiding failures to address the situation of women who are
multiply subjected, who under the abstract equality approach are open to the
dodge that their discrimination is based on factors other than sex.55 Here,
they are women. Women encompass characteristics of virtually every social
group: women’s diverse qualities and inequalities substantially make up
what a woman is. When used through or with sex or gender to discriminate
against them, that is discrimination because they are women, therefore what
discrimination against women as such looks like.
Section 2. Equality of rights shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex (including pregnancy,
gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity), and/or race (including
ethnicity, national origin, or color), and/or like grounds of subordination (such as disability or faith). No law or its interpretation shall give
force to common law disadvantages that exist on the ground(s) enumerated in this Amendment.

Section 2 provides for negative rights that are predicated on discriminatory state action, state or federal. Once rights are provided unequally, a
legal claim of discrimination can arise. This Section adapts in its first sentence the basic language of the ERA proposed in 1972, passage of which
would itself be an improvement.56 Notably, the first clause of Section 2 is

54. The first time the idea of substantive equality was spoken in public was 1989. See CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, BUTTERFLY POLITICS 110 (2017). See generally MACKINNON, supra note 40 (developing the concept of substantive equality across U.S., comparative, and international law and theory); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Substantive Equality Revisited: A Rejoinder to Sandra Fredman, 15 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 1174 (2017) (arguing that hierarchy of power is the fundamental dynamic of inequality); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Substantive Equality: A Perspective, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (2011) (arguing that reality of substantive inequality should be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee).
55. See generally KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW, ON INTERSECTIONALITY (forthcoming 2020); Kimberlé
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139–40, 166–67;
Kimberlé Crenshaw, The Urgency of Intersectionality, TEDWOMEN (Oct. 2016),
https://www.ted.com/talks/kimberle_crenshaw_the_urgency_of_intersectionality
[https://perma.cc/J4V5-E994]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Why Intersectionality Can’t Wait, WASH. POST
(Sept.
24,
2015,
3:00
PM
EST),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory
/wp/2015/09/24/why-intersectionality-cant-wait [https://perma.cc/X3LL-GWCH].
56. For the conventional articulation of the interpretation of the 1972 ERA, which may yet be ratified, see generally Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for
Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
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identical to the Nineteenth Amendment and the 1972 ERA, but for its substitution of “equality of rights” in place of the right to vote.57 Some of the
equality theory animating the Equality Amendment—for instance, its substantive and concrete rather than formal and abstract approach, and its understanding of intersectionality as a necessary component of sex—could be
used in interpreting the 1972 ERA, should it be ratified and come into force.
The language of the Equality Amendment locks in its distinctive approach,
meaning, and application. Providing such explicit instruction to courts makes
it less likely that the standard symmetrical approach to equality will be reflexively applied and the asymmetries—that is, the actual social inequalities
that need to be remedied—will remain ignored. The express reference to subordination in the Equality Amendment provides more substantive language
that otherwise could be reduced to anti-classification (as if classification is
the only injury of subordination, when it is merely one tool of it), or to antistereotyping (as if being typecast as a member of a group of which one is a
member is the essence of inequality, when it is merely one tool of it, and
only sometimes). Hierarchy is inequality’s real injury. And, of course, the
Equality Amendment applies beyond sex itself.
Pregnancy, gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity are grouped
under “sex” because they are all facets of the unified but diverse system of
inequality that privileges maleness and masculinity over femaleness and
femininity, enforcing sexual rules and gendered myths, roles and stereotypes, and punishing noncompliance. Discrimination against transgender or
nonbinary persons based on gender or sex, including nonconformity, would
be covered. Similarly, ethnicity, national origin, and color are grouped under
“race” because they are complexly but inexorably racialized in the United
States, privileging whiteness and punishing as lesser anyone seen as not socalled white.
Adaptability is part of the ingenuity, the genius, of inequality. Section
2’s “like grounds” clause is thus open-ended, while maintaining race and sex
as the substantive touchstones for the covered inequalities. The “like
grounds” clause permits recognition of as yet unknown or unanticipated
forms inequality can take.
This Amendment is designed to cover lacunae in existing law. Disability is expressly covered because of inadequacies in existing legislation and a
general failure to recognize that it is social assumptions, not individuals’ particular abilities, that result in the deprivation of resources and dignity and
extreme marginalization of disability discrimination. Like every inequality,
discriminatory deprivations are distinctive to this ground: distinctively

57.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
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wrenching, extreme, irrational, and cumulatively and systemically disadvantaging.
Although many constitutional and statutory provisions exist to protect
spiritual beliefs and practices, including those fundamental to the Founding,
failures to protect minority religions make clear the need to include this provision expressly.58 All groups are entitled to constitutional rights, but dominant religions have less purchase here, as they would need to show subordination, a substantive term relative to evidence, similar to that suffered by
women and people of color, who lack adequate coverage by existing law.
One possible like ground, adequately litigated, could be social and economic class. But race and sex discrimination together and separately do a
great deal of class work. Just how much of class disadvantage would be left
if race and sex inequality were adequately addressed is an open question. In
addition, class as a factor, for women especially, is often vicarious and protean, its features calling for full concrete development.
Of course, the Equality Amendment’s language does not imply or permit an intent requirement. This is because discrimination is not a moral failing of individuals but a pervasive social practice of power—epistemic, practical, and structural. No one need intend to perpetuate discrimination for it to
persist. Therefore, no showing of intent is required to legally undo and remedy it.
The last sentence of Section 2 prohibits interpretive piggybacking on
existing long-term discrimination that is built into the common law. Consider
that Section 1 would prohibit as a denial of equality much social discrimination that is not now prohibited and is embodied in common law. A cardinal
example of denying force to common law disadvantages predicated on inequality is Shelley v. Kraemer, in which state court decisions upholding racially restrictive covenants were denied enforcement under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.59 This ruling has been largely confined to its facts; its larger animating principle is captured in Section 3.
Section 3. To fully realize the rights guaranteed under this Amendment, Congress and the several States shall take legislative and other
measures to prevent or redress any disadvantage suffered by individuals or groups because of past and/or present inequality as prohibited
by this Amendment, and shall take all steps requisite and effective to
abolish prior laws, policies, or constitutional provisions that impede

58. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (upholding the Trump Administration’s
“Muslim Ban”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quashing a Muslim detainee’s claims of discrimination and mistreatment). While text matters in interpretation, conflicts between provisions cannot be
entirely precluded by drafting.
59. 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948).
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equal political representation.

The word “shall” affirmatively requires legislative and administrative
authorities to implement this Amendment. There is no option not to, although
the text of the Section leaves its precise implementation open.
The distribution of political power built into the Constitution impedes
democratic progress, making it far easier to sustain conditions made unconstitutional by this Amendment than to dismantle them. The undemocratic
protection, promotion, and insulation of an unequal socioeconomic order—
slavery—continues to structure the political system under which leadership
is elected, undermining the capacity for change in accordance with this
Amendment. It must be dislodged from the Constitution’s foundation. Section 3 leaves to Congress the task of evaluating the Electoral College, for
example, but giving more weight to voters in some states than in others in
presidential elections would likely invalidate it. Upon ratification of this
Amendment, Congress would be required to take up the question under this
Amendment’s approach.
Section 4. Nothing in Section 2 shall invalidate a law, program, or activity that is protected or required under Section 1 or 3.

Undoing discrimination is not discrimination. Promoting equality undoes inequality. Section 4 repudiates the premise that classification per se is
the injury of inequality and embraces the understanding that group hierarchy
is the essence of inequality’s injury.60 Accordingly, this Section requires that
any law, policy, or practice qualifying as protected or required under Sections 1 and 3 may not be eliminated under Section 2. Currently, for example,
affirmative-action plans and policies can be constitutionally challenged as
discriminatory based on the notion that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
treatment based on categories or classifications rather than imposed relations
of superiority and inferiority among groups or precluded opportunities of
certain groups.61 So long as the requirements of Sections 1 and/or 3 are met,
and it is recognized that the Equality Amendment supersedes the Equal Protection Clause (and Fifth Amendment Due Process as to the federal government) in the equality arena, as it should, this reverse engineering of inequality into equality guarantees would be over.

60. This proposed section parallels Section 15(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
which states that the equal-rights protection found in Section 15(1) “does not preclude any law, program
or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups.”
Can. Const. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. 1 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 15(2).
61. John Valery White, What is Affirmative Action?, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2117, 2124 (2004).
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III. RECONSTITUTING THE FUTURE

The proposed Equality Amendment embraces an intersectional approach to equality, prioritizing race and gender for historical as well as contemporary reasons. This year’s Nineteenth Amendment Centennial, commemorating women’s right to vote, must not obscure the reality that not all
women became full citizens upon the Amendment’s passage. As the suffrage
struggle for the Nineteenth Amendment demonstrates, the political processes
used to change laws deeply influence the substantive changes that those laws
can produce. The fight for the vote for all women was intertwined with attempts to repeal the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from denying the right to vote based on race, color, or prior servitude,62 because of
white racist fears of enfranchising Black women.63 The suffrage movement
often excluded African American women from its marches and speaking
platforms, despite their determined support for the right to vote.64 Historical
disempowerment of women of color by some women’s suffrage organizers
and entities contributed to a demobilization that has undermined their full
participation in the political process, and thus real democracy, today. The
Equality Amendment is therefore predicated on recognizing the full interconnection between race- and gender-based subordination and is designed to
deinstitutionalize it in all of its forms. But in recognition of the relationship
between the politics of lawmaking and the law that politics makes, it will be
the political mobilization, if pursued by the politics that animate this text,
that produces its passage, as much as anything in its wording, that guarantees
that the dual erasure of women of color is not replicated.
The Equality Amendment has been needed all along. But it is needed
now as much or more than ever. Without equality, democracy is in peril: real
equality provides the voting power to break the glass ceiling, guaranteed
rights that raise the floor for all citizens, and recognition of the reality that
inequalities intersect and overlap, making it impossible to rectify one alone.
All Americans deserve equality guarantees that cannot be taken away or disregarded. And in a true democracy, each citizen should have an equal right
to vote and have their vote count equally. Only the Constitution can provide
this power and protection. But no constitutional amendment alone can guarantee these results. History shows that law is subject to retrenchment as well

62. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
63. See Kimberly A. Hamlin, How Racism Almost Killed Women’s Right to Vote, WASH. POST (June
4,
2019,
6:00
AM
EST),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/06/04/how
-racism-almost-killed-womens-right-vote [https://perma.cc/H7PP-P8A8].
64. See, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS, Racism in the Woman Suffrage Movement, in WOMEN, RACE, AND
CLASS 70, 70–86 (1981).
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as advance, particularly when emerging from and overlaid upon a nonintersectional power grid. This is not a reason to succumb, but a challenge to
create the conditions for change.
Most Americans believe that the Constitution already guarantees equal
rights.65 Unlike most constitutions in the world, it does not.66 It is the responsibility of “We, the People” to adapt the Constitution to the society we live
in; to grow in our recognition of problems and potential solutions; to
strengthen our democracy in an intimately interconnected world. Neither too
vague nor too prescriptive, this proposal, offered as a beginning, aspires to
sketch a path, to clear terrain to open a space for everyone to fill and, finally,
to be heard.
Generations past have fought and died for equality, bringing us to this
moment. The perceptions, principles, and language of this proposal can be
used as a guide to legal and political action in every realm. Having broken
the code by which U.S. equality law and theory has been constrained from
fulfilling its promise, we are determined to be the last generation to fight for
it. We can all be framers.

65. A 2016 poll commissioned by the Equal Rights Amendment Coalition suggests that eighty percent of Americans believe that the Constitution guarantees equal rights to men and women. Nicole Tortoriello,
Making
the
Case
for
the
Equal
Rights
Amendment,
ACLU
V A.
(Jan. 3, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://acluva.org/en/news/making-case-equal-rights-amendment
[https://perma.cc/K8JG-Y2YA].
66. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Gender in Constitutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 397, 404 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).

